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Abstract 
Risk Monitor is a specific application of probability safety analysis (PSA) in nuclear power plant. This paper 
introduced the concept of risk monitor. According to the requirement of risk monitor, a comprehensive analysis was 
performed on the system. Based on the analysis, a risk monitor system was developed on browser/server structure 
with a detail introduction on the design of the system structure, database, interfaces, and functions. Finally, several 
practical applications were made to the system based on a risk monitor model of one specific plant. The results 
indicate that this risk monitor system is able to successfully implement all the required functions and is competent for 
correctly reflecting the plant risk so as to support the plant staff for decision-making. 
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1. Introduction 
Risk Monitor is one specific application of PSA to Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). It is capable of 
determining the time-in-point risk based on the actual plant configuration and indicating operation 
suggestions, which allows the plant staff to perform a more reasonable process for risk management. The 
term Risk Monitor has been defined as IAEA as “a plant specific real-time analysis tool used to determine 
the instantaneous risk based on the actual status of the systems and components. At any given time, the 
Risk Monitor reflects the current plant configuration in terms of the known status of the various systems 
and/ or components – for example, whether there are any components out of service for maintenance or 
tests. The Risk Monitor model is based on, and is consistent with, the Living PSA. It is updated with the 
same frequency as the Living PSA. The Risk Monitor is used by the plant staff in support of operational 
decisions.”[1] 
The first risk monitor system was put into service in UK in 1988 and has been widely used around the 
world from then on. The risk monitor system is able to indicate which components withdrawn should be 
restored first or which components should be avoided being out of service. It can also be used to optimize 
maintenance schedule to eliminate the high peaks in the risk and make the on-line maintenance more 
frequent and flexible, thereby shorten the refueling period and save cost for plant operation. 
The plant configuration is generally input into the risk monitor system manually by the plant staff. 
However, along with the development of risk monitor system, currently a few systems have realized 
automatic input of the plant configuration. Risk monitor also concerns about the trade-off between 
calculation speed and precision. Most risk monitors are able to maintain the calculation time within 5 
minutes on an acceptable precision. 
2. System Analysis 
Unlike the professional software for PSA analysis, the risk monitor system is designed mainly for plant 
operation and maintenance personnel, therefore it should not be depend on the user to have any specialist 
techniques of PSA modeling. Moreover, the component or system code should also be consistent with 
those in plant. One of the most significant features for risk monitor system is to provide quantitative 
information such as CDF, LERF/LRF and AOT/ACT, and qualitative information based on the Risk-
Informed Technical Specification (RI-TS) and defence-in-depth philosophy. The risk monitor system will 
indicate the related mitigation and preventive procedure when limited operation conditions are reached 
according to the RI-TS. Besides, certain operation history information searching functions should also be 
incorporated into the risk monitor system to facilitate the decision making for plant personnel, for 
example the risk curve display function. 
2.1.  System Overview 
Based on the risk monitor system requirement mentioned above, this paper has divided the system into 
three parts, specifically the Input Module, Data Process (DP) Module and Output Module. The 
relationship of these three modules is shown in figure 1 as a flow chart. 
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Fig. 1.  Risk Monitor system flow chart 
During risk monitor system operation, data from the user will be received by the Input Module. Then 
the data is sent to the DP Module to calculate the minimal cut-sets (MCSs) and plant risk. The Output 
Module is responsible for sending the results onto the user interface to indicate the plant status, current 
risk as well as operation suggestion, etc. 
A risk monitor system is developed according to this chart. The following discussion will mainly focus 
on the system structure building, system design and system functions realizing. 
3. System Development 
System structure determines how the client will communicate with the server. Most risk monitor 
systems developed in early years run on the user’s local computer or are based on the Client/Server (C/S) 
structure, both of which are more costly in system upkeep and less compatible compared to another 
structure called Browser/Server (B/S) structure.  
B/S structure consists of Web server and client browser. This structure has greatly simplified the work 
on the client, which means more tasks including database interaction as well as application performance 
will be assigned to the server, such that less software is needed to be installed and configured on the user 
computer. These features also explain its advantage in system deployment and upkeep. As a result, risk 
monitor system on B/S structure has become more and more favorable to the plant personnel and program 
developers. 
This paper chose B/S structure to develop the risk monitor system by use of WAMP (Windows, 
Apache, MySQL and PHP) framework. WAMP framework is one of the most prevalent frameworks 
worldwide that can be applied to B/S structure. It is composed of the Windows operating system, Apache 
web server, MySQL database and PHP (or Perl, Python) language, most of which are open source 
products. WAMP has more web material and is lighter compared to the Java/J2EE; and is more 
compatible, lower in cost and higher in performance compared to the .NET framework. 
3.1. Database Design 
Unlike the professional PSA analysis software, more logical data table other than model data table 
should be established to meet the requirement of risk monitor system. The following data tables are 
mainly designed according to the instruction in section 2. 
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• Mapping data table: to reflect the relationship between component and basic events, system and trains, 
environment factor and initiating events affected; 
• Plant status data table: to store and present the plant status; 
• Plant risk data table: to indicate the current plant risk and plot the risk curve; 
• Maintenance schedule data table: to store and present the maintenance plan; 
• Maintenance schedule result data table: to store the maintenance risk correlated to the cut-off value 
and plant configuration to make a pre-solved calculation of maintenance schedule; 
• Plant system/train status data table: to store and present the status of plant system and train; 
• RI-TS data table: to store the RI-TS contents to facilitate determination of current plant status and 
provide operation suggestion; 
• History log data table: to watch the plant operation history and log; 
3.2. Interface Design 
DIV+CSS technique is used for interface design for risk monitor development. In addition, AJAX and 
Flash is used to optimize the looking of the interface and the user experience. The following pages are 
designed for risk monitor system based on the requirement of system structure and function. 
• Plant status page: to present basic plant information on current configuration, as well as to provide 
operation suggestion for decision making; 
• Plant configuration page: to modify the operation data according to the current plant configuration in 
several ways (see section 3.3); 
• Detail plant information page: to present the user an entire view of the plant status, including the 
current plant configuration, plant risk, component (or train/system) importance, risk curve, distribution 
of initiator contribution, operation log, etc. The user can also generate operation report from this page; 
• Maintenance schedule page: to present the maintenance schedule in terms of Gantt charts, which allow 
user to edit the schedule directly upon the chart. It is also available to display the schedule risk and 
component importance for each time phase; 
• Configuration page: to modify risk acceptance criteria, risk limits, calculation features, mapping 
relationship, and page style. 
3.3. System Function 
Based on the system design, a risk monitor system is developed based on the B/S structure, and has 
realized the essential functions shown as below. 
• Plant configuration input and calculation. The system allows the plant personnel to input the status of 
more than one system, train or component simultaneously, or to input the configuration from a defined 
maintenance schedule, which is able to effectively avoid the input mistake from the user, provided that 
the plant is strictly maintained according to the maintenance schedule. This function will also indicate 
an unscheduled withdrawn or restoration that is not consistent with the maintenance plan (for example, 
if there is a corrective maintenance), such that the plant staff could check whether the configuration is 
feasible. The user may also choose an environment factor according to the plant-specific environment, 
because certain weather condition may affect the failure rate of some initiating events. The status of 
system or trains alignment will also be reflected on the risk monitor. Change of alignment will affect 
the failure mode of related components. 
• Plant status output. This function is responsible for presenting the user the outcomes after risk 
calculation. These output information includes core damage frequency (CDF), large early release 
frequency/large release frequency (LERF/LRF), AOT, FV importance, RAW importance, restoration 
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risk for withdrawn components, initiator contribution distribution, risk curves and accumulative risk 
curves. Warning message will be sent to the user if there exists any exceedance of the plant risk. In 
addition, the consistency between the plant and the RI-TS will be evaluated and shown to the plant 
personnel for decision making. All the outcomes mentioned above can be recorded as PDF or MS 
Word format. 
• Maintenance scheduling. This function allow the user to schedule the maintenance plan directly on the 
Gantt chart, or complete the schedule by loading an external maintenance plan generated by other 
schedule making programs. The CDF/LERF/LRF risk curves and component importance of each time 
phase will be calculated and present on the user screen. Warning message will also be sent if there 
exists an excess to a certain limit value. The status of plant system and train is also indicated on 
another Gantt chart to facilitate the schedule making. The maintenance schedule can be saved for 
further modification or generated as reports with a PDF or MS Word format. 
4. System Application 
One plant-specific risk monitor model was selected for system application. This model is derived from 
the living PSA (LPSA) model of the plant. Conversions were made for the LPSA model, including 
extending the lumped initiating events, run/standby trains modeling, maintenance events removing, 
common cause failure (CCF) events adjustment, and mapping database building. The risk monitor model 
is verified before system application. 
After a few tests, a cut-off value of 1.0E-11 was chosen for the risk monitor calculation to ensure the 
speed and precision. In addition, for convenience of results analysis, the risk limits definition is listed in 
table 2. These limit values separate the plant risk into four areas, each of which is indicated by a particular 
color. However, there are no criteria for the definition of the limits. A set of default values were given by 
the system, and it may also accept a user-defined values. 
Table 2. Definition of plant risk limits 
Color of indication Risk Limits（Rbase is defined as the basic plant risk, which is 2.11E-7/year）
Green Rbase ~ 10Rbase
Yellow 10Rbase ~ 50Rbase
Orange 50Rbase ~ 500Rbase
Red Above 500Rbase
4.1. Plant Configuration Input 
It is assumed that one component cooling system (CCS) pump and the check valve of one train in the 
main feedwater system (FWS) are out of service for maintenance, while one accumulator is not able to 
perform its mitigation function. This configuration can be input into the risk monitor system from the 
input module. It should be noted that plant configuration input by multiple users is forbidden by the 
system to ensure that the plant status is unique at one certain time point. 
4.2. Plant Status Output 
The outcomes calculated based on the plant configuration above are shown in figure 2. The basic risk 
information and operation suggestion are given in this figure for operation personnel to make decisions. 
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Fig. 2.  Plant risk status page 
It is shown in this figure that the CDF is 5.64E-6/year at current plant configuration, which is within 
the range of 10Rbase ~ 50Rbase. Therefore, the CDF risk meter is rendered as a color of yellow, suggesting 
the operation staff that mitigating procedure be performed to avoid long exposure in such configuration. 
Measures may be taken according to the “operation suggestion” table which contains the RI-TS 
requirements (at the left-bottom of the figure) or the component restoration risk chart as shown in figure 3.  
Fig. 3.  Column chart of components restoration risk 
This figure tells the plant staff what the plant risk will be if certain withdrawn component is restored. It 
is shown in the first column of this chart that the plant risk will return to the green range if the 
accumulator in train A (ACATK001) is restored. As a result, the ACATK001 restoration is the first 
priority for the plant operation. This indication is consistent with the result shown in the “operation 
suggestion” table, which is “restore the accumulator to operable status within 8 hours”. On the other hand, 
it is also shown in this figure that the plant risk will be hardly reduced if component cooling pump A 
(CCAPM01A) or main feedwater check valve (FWAAV250) is returned to operation. 
The RAW importance of each component will also be presented to indicate the plant personnel the 
components that should not be withdrew, as shown in figure 4. It can be seen that the core makeup tank 
failure (CMATK001) or plugged (CMAOR001) of train A is the most significant contributor to CDF, 
leading a “red condition” to the plant status, which is not acceptable. The inspection of this kind of 
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component should be enhanced. Moreover, some components failures will cause the plant status to an 
orange range, which indicate that the plant personnel should pay more attention on them. 
Fig. 4.  Column chart of components RAW 
Based on the outcomes above, the plant personnel is supposed to take measures to restore the 
operability of the accumulator in train A within 8 hours, to reduce plant risk; in addition, more inspections 
should be made on the core makeup tank (CMT) in train A. 
4.3. Maintenance Scheduling 
It is assumed that the maintenance schedule is defined in table 3. 
Table 3. Maintenance Schedule 
Components Withdrawn time Restored time 
CCS pump A 2010-2-20 10:10:00 2010-7-10 10:10:00 
FWS pump A 2010-4-10 10:00:00 2010-8-10 10:00:00 
Diesel generator pump A 2010-7-20 16:00:00 2010-12-20 16:00:00 
Diesel generator pump B 2010-12-10 12:00:00 2011-1-10 12:00:00 
The maintenance schedule can be reflected on the risk monitor system, as shown in figure 5. 
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Fig. 5.  Maintenance schedule page 
The three charts in this figure have specifically presented the information of maintenance schedule, 
system/train status and risk curve. The maintenance schedule can be edited directly on the Gantt chart. 
The status of system/train is shown in the second Gantt chart, with color indication. Suppose the least 
number of trains available for a certain system to complete its safety function is N, then the method for 
determining the system status is define in table 4[2].
Table 4. Method of system status determination 
Number of trains available Status Color of indication  
< N Unacceptable risk  Red  
= N High risk Orange  
= N+1 Moderate risk  Yellow  
> N+1 Low risk Green 
Take the FWS in figure 5 as an example. This system has three trains while the least number of trains 
available is 1 (i.e. N=1). During time period between 2010-4-10 10:00:00 and 2010-8-10 10:00:00, 
because of the withdrawn of FWS pump A, FWS train A is unavailable. Therefore the current number of 
trains available is 2, which renders the system status as an indication of yellow according to the 
methodology defined in table 4. 
The plant risk during the entire maintenance schedule is plotted on the risk curve chart, including CDF 
and LERF/LRF risk curve. It is shown in the chart that a high peak exists in the risk curve, which should 
be avoided during the schedule. This high peak is caused by the simultaneous maintenance of the diesel 
generator pump A and B. One possible solution is to change the finish time of diesel generator pump A 
ahead to 2010-11-20 16:00:00, resulting in an updated maintenance schedule shown in figure 6. 
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Fig. 6.  Optimized maintenance schedule page 
It can be seen from the risk curve chart that the high peak of risk has been eliminated. Once the 
schedule risk calculation is performed, the outcomes will be automatically recorded for a certain plant 
configuration at a given calculation feature, to avoid potential repeated calculations after the schedule has 
been changed. For example, for the schedule updating process discussed above, because all the 
configurations in the new schedule have been calculated and recorded during the original schedule 
calculation, the result of the new schedule will be generated immediately after that user presses the 
calculation button, without referring to the calculation engine. This feature usually will greatly improve 
the efficiency of the schedule making when modification is applied to the schedule.  
5. Conclusion 
Currently, the development of this risk monitor system has been completed, and tests have been 
implemented on this system. It is shown that the system is capable of performing the function for 
monitoring plant risk, and supporting the plant staff for decision making. 
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